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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order granting suppression of
evidence. The state challenges the district court’s determination that although
the officer had reasonable suspicion that the car he stopped violated Idaho’s
window tint laws, the stop was nevertheless unlawful because the car was in
compliance with the tint laws of another state.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A state trooper stopped the car Debra Noeller was driving because “the
side and rear windows appeared to be darker than … what the law allows.”
(Prelim. Tr., p. 4, L. 4 – p. 6, L. 4; p. 7, L. 11 – p. 9, L. 13; p. 10, Ls. 9-12.) After
Noeller and her passenger gave incompatible answers to troopers regarding their
trip and regarding each other, and because the car was not registered to either of
them, troopers requested consent to search the car. (Prelim. Tr., p. 14, L. 12 – p.
20, L. 17; p. 81, L. 21 – p. 85, L. 4.) Noeller granted consent, and the search
produced evidence of methamphetamine and paraphernalia. (Prelim. Tr., p. 25,
L. 14 – p. 26, L. 23; p. 28, L. 20 – p. 32, L. 14; p. 34, L. 7 – p. 39, L. 8; p. 84, L.
16 – p. 85, L. 4.) Using a tint meter a trooper also checked the window tint, and
found the sides and back windows ranging from 32% to 12% light transmission,
generally darker than allowed by Idaho law. (Prelim. Tr., p. 32, L. 15 – p. 34, L.
4.)
The state charged Noeller with trafficking in 400 grams or more of
methamphetamine for the large amounts hidden in the car and possession of
1

methamphetamine for the amount in her purse. (R., pp. 45-46.) Noeller moved
to suppress the evidence from the stop and search. (R., pp. 54-55.) The district
court granted the motion, finding there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop
because even though the window tinting was not in compliance with Idaho law, it
was in compliance with law of the state where the car was registered—Arizona,
and then dismissed the case. (R., pp. 117-24, 132.) The state appealed. (R.,
pp. 135-37.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it concluded that reasonable suspicion the
car was being operated in violation of Idaho’s window tint law was insufficient to
justify the traffic stop?
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ARGUMENT
Reasonable Suspicion That Noeller’s Car Violated Idaho’s Window Tinting
Statute Justified The Stop
A.

Introduction
There was no dispute that the trooper had reasonable suspicion that

Noeller was operating a car in violation of Idaho’s window tint law. (See R., p.
117 (“Trooper Peeples observed a silver Chevy Cobalt traveling east bound that
appeared to have darker window tinting on the side and rear windows than what
is allowed by Idaho law.”).) The district court, however, “[found] that the Idaho
law regarding window tinting, I.C. § 49-944, applies only to vehicles registered in
Idaho.” (R., p. 122.) Finding no reasonable suspicion the window tinting violated
Arizona law, the district court suppressed all evidence discovered as a result of
the traffic stop and dismissed the charges. (R., pp. 122, 132.) Applying relevant
legal standards shows the district court erred by concluding that suspicion the car
was being driven in violation of Idaho’s laws was insufficient to justify the traffic
stop.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court

accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts.

State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).

The

interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over which
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the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796,
798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004).
C.

Reasonable Suspicion The Car Was Being Driven In Violation Of Idaho’s
Window Tint Laws Justified The Traffic Stop
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants

and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). Limited
investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable,
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811,
203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate
possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the
vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.” Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167
P.3d at 785 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). “Reasonable
suspicion requires less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct
on the part of the officer.” State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673,
675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at or before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at
1210; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
In this case the district court found that the car driven by Noeller
“appeared to have darker window tinting on the side and rear windows than what
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is allowed by Idaho law.” (R., p. 117.) Idaho law disallows tinting darker than
35% light transmission (“with a tolerance limit of plus or minus three percent
(3%)”) for the driver’s side window, the passenger’s side window, and the rear
windshield. I.C. § 49-944(1)(b). The light transmission for side windows to the
rear of the driver must be 10% (with a tolerance of 3%) or more. I.C. § 49944(1)(c). Idaho law makes it an infraction to “operate on the public highways …
any motor vehicle with a windshield or windows which are not in compliance with
the provisions of this section.” I.C. § 49-944(2). Because the trooper reasonably
suspected the side and rear windows of the car were less than the allowed light
transmission, he had reasonable suspicion of a traffic infraction, which justified
the traffic stop.
The district court’s legal conclusion that the Idaho window tint statute did
not apply to Noeller’s conduct because the car she was driving was registered in
Arizona was erroneous. The Idaho window tinting statute provides that “[n]o
person shall operate on the public highways … any motor vehicle with a
windshield or windows which are not in compliance with the provisions of this
section.”

I.C. § 49-944(2) (emphasis added). This language simply forecloses

the district court’s analysis that cars registered in Arizona fall outside the scope
of this statute.
To justify its failure to apply the plain language of the statute the district
court cited State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d 1121 (2013). (R., pp. 12122 (“guided by the Morgan decision” the district court found the window tinting
statute “applies only to vehicles registered in Idaho”).)
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In Morgan the Idaho

Supreme Court determined that the requirement of display of both front and rear
plates in I.C. § 49-428 “does not extend to vehicles registered in other states.”
154 Idaho at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124. Chapter 4 of Title 49, where I.C. § 49-428 is
located, addresses registration and licensing of vehicles in the State of Idaho.
Thus, when I.C. § 49-428 requires that “[l]icense plates assigned to a motor
vehicle” be “attached, one (1) in the front and the other in the rear,” the natural
reading of that statute is that it is limited to the license plates assigned pursuant
to that chapter. Such would not, by the plain language of the statute, apply to
license plates assigned by other states under their laws. Because the holding of
Morgan was limited to the statute at issue, the district court erred by reading
Morgan as holding that Idaho’s traffic laws generally do not apply to motorists
from out-of-state.
Because Morgan was based on the scope of the statute in question, and
not on some broad unarticulated concept that none of Idaho’s traffic laws apply to
out-of-state motorists, the district court’s expansion of Morgan’s holding was
erroneous. The plain language of I.C. § 49-944(2) shows it applies to any car
driven in Idaho. Noeller was driving the car in Idaho. Therefore reasonable
suspicion she was violating I.C. § 49-944(2) provided constitutional grounds for
the traffic stop.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s
order of suppression, vacate its order dismissing, and remand for further
proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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